– the cracks in the system already exist.
The closing years of the 2020s invite an uneasy historical comparison: not to moments of resolution, but to periods when pressure was still accumulating and the shape of what would break was not yet clear. In the United States the great experiment in self‑government nearly fell apart and then, through the Federalist Papers, founders argued for a new constitutional order. Today the stage is global and the stakes are larger. Armed conflicts, environmental crises and the weaponization of information are now viewed by risk experts as the most immediate threats to world stability[1]. A survey of over 900 leaders for the World Economic Forum’s Global Risks Report 2025 found that state‑based armed conflict is the top immediate risk for 2025, with geopolitical fragmentation close behind[2]. Misinformation and disinformation were ranked as leading short‑term risks[1], and nearly two‑thirds of respondents expect a “turbulent or stormy” world by 2035[3]. In this fractured landscape even the most powerful states struggle to provide for their citizens; our shared institutions look increasingly anachronistic.
Consider the United Nations. As the organisation turns eighty, its operations are constrained by an acute liquidity crisis. Secretary‑General António Guterres warned in October 2025 that the UN faces a “race to bankruptcy” unless member states pay their mandatory contributions on time[4]. The regular budget has been slashed, staff posts are being cut by almost 19 % and arrears topped $760 million[4]. The House of Commons Library notes that the UN’s financial woes stem largely from members failing to meet their legally‑binding contributions; officials warn that continued shortfalls “could jeopardise critical elements” of the UN’s work[5]. Beyond finance, the organisation’s inability to prevent wars in Ukraine, Gaza, Sudan and Myanmar has amplified calls for reform and eroded trust in its collective security mandate. An institution designed in 1945 to keep the peace is struggling to function in a world of multipolar competition, cyber‑warfare and non‑state actors.
Recent events show how fragile that order has become. On 3 January 2026 U.S. forces launched an operation in Caracas that bombarded the Venezuelan capital and abducted President Nicolás Maduro and his wife. Independent United Nations experts condemned the operation as a grave violation of international law, warning that the unprovoked use of force against Venezuela breached Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and risked destabilising the region[6]. In a joint statement, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Spain and Uruguay said unilateral strikes “contravene fundamental principles of international law” and set an extremely dangerous precedent for regional peace[7], while the UN Secretary‑General reiterated that the events underscored the need for all states to respect the Charter[8]. UN special rapporteurs warned that tolerating such acts would normalise lawlessness and fatally undermine the global order[9]. The abduction also reminded smaller states that their sovereignty depends on the restraint of larger powers[10]. When one permanent member of the Security Council attacks another state without authorisation, the system has no meaningful remedy, and other leaders rightly fear that they could be next.
The UN’s own rules compound this paralysis. The veto power granted to five permanent Security Council members allows any one of them to block collective action. In June 2025, for example, a draft resolution demanding a permanent ceasefire in Gaza won 14 votes but failed because the United States cast a single veto[11]. Observers noted that this and similar episodes reveal a deeper problem: the Council is often unable to respond to mass atrocity situations because of “deep political divisions and/or the veto prerogative” of its permanent members[12]. Calls for reform, including proposals to restrain veto use in cases of genocide or mass atrocities, underscore how an instrument intended to foster consensus now enables inaction. As long as the veto remains sacrosanct, the Council cannot reliably prevent wars or protect civilians.
Even alliances once considered bedrock are showing fissures. At the June 2025 NATO summit in The Hague, European allies and Canada pledged to spend 5 % of GDP on defence to satisfy U.S. pressure[13]. Analysts noted that the meeting, meant to demonstrate unity against Russian aggression, highlighted an outdated model: Europe still expects Washington to shoulder the bulk of deterrence while failing to integrate its own defence industries[14]. Defence spending across approximately 30 national industrial bases remains wasteful and duplicative, leaving European militaries “way less than the sum of their parts”[15]. New spending targets distract from the urgent task of integrating European defence efforts and may trigger a guns‑versus‑butter fight at home[16]. The New America think‑tank reached a similar conclusion: the five‑percent pledge exposed economic and geographic fault lines in the alliance, with Eastern European states eager to meet high spending targets while Spain negotiated an opt‑out and Slovakia called the targets “absurd”[17]. In other words, what some celebrate as NATO’s revival looks to others like an expensive exercise papering over disagreements.
Meanwhile, America’s domestic scene feeds anxiety about the future of democracy. Political violence is rising: researchers noted that political violence in the United States reached its highest level since the 1970s, with roughly 150 recorded politically motivated attacks in the first half of 2025, almost twice as many as in the same period of 2024[18]. Support for force against political opponents grew significantly between 2024 and 2025[19]. Yet warnings that the country is “on the verge of civil war” are themselves a form of destabilising rhetoric. Scholars of civil conflict caution that risks of an actual U.S. civil war in 2026 are negligible, and that such rhetoric “is counterproductive and inflammatory”[20]. Modern definitions of civil war require organised opposition groups and thousands of battlefield deaths (despite the president’s use of the insurrection act notwithstanding); while the United States is deeply polarised, no secessionist movement meets those criteria[21]. The greatest danger is a cycle of sporadic lone‑gunman violence stoked by misperceptions of the other side[20]. Hyperbolic talk of impending civil war therefore obscures the real issues: rising political violence, distrust and online echo chambers which continue to create a destabilizing environment for true democracy to flourish.
Popular uprisings elsewhere reveal both the fragility of authoritarian regimes and the limits of external intervention. In late December 2025, a rapid currency collapse sparked the largest protests in Iran since the Mahsa Amini uprising of 2022. What began as economic grievances soon morphed into demands for political reform and an end to the Islamic Republic[22]. Demonstrations spread across cities and universities despite an internet blackout and lethal repression, with crowds chanting anti‑government slogans and hoisting the pre‑revolution flag[23]. Iranians abroad report that their friends and relatives describe people inside the country as “hopeful, strong [and] angry”; many believe the government will fall even if change takes a generation[24]. These voices insist that Iranians must reclaim their country themselves rather than rely on foreign intervention[24]. Scholars note that sanctions, economic collapse and recent military defeats have left the regime unusually vulnerable; massacres can become turning points that demoralise security forces and trigger defections[25]. Whether or not this wave succeeds, it highlights how domestic unrest in an authoritarian state can ripple through regional geopolitics and illustrates the widespread yearning for more accountable governance even under the harshest regimes.
Taken together, all of these trends suggest that our present international order is neither functioning as intended nor equipped to handle twenty‑first‑century challenges. The UN cannot pay its bills[4][5]; NATO pledges distract from structural weaknesses[14][17]; American democracy faces violent fringe actors leading to talk of civil war at home and abroad[20][18]. Meanwhile climate disasters, AI‑driven misinformation and great‑power competition deepen mistrust[1][26]. When institutions designed after World War II are asked to manage this complexity, frustration and cynicism are understandable. But despair is not our only option. Just as the Federalist Papers of the 1780s argued that the Articles of Confederation were inadequate and sketched a more durable constitutional framework, we can imagine and debate new political designs suited to our era.
This series of essays will proceed in that spirit. Rather than offering slogans, the next paper will lay out the assumptions underpinning our proposed system: realistic views of human psychology, power dynamics, scarcity and incentives. Subsequent instalments will explore institutional design, asking how to constrain and distribute power across local, national and global levels, and how to create feedback loops that reward cooperative behaviour. We will examine representation and decision‑making, balancing the efficiency of technocratic expertise with the legitimacy of broad participation. Later papers will propose mechanisms for global coordination on issues such as climate, biotechnology and artificial intelligence, without smothering local autonomy. We will also grapple with economic structures, debating how to align markets with ecological limits and social wellbeing. Throughout, we will interrogate the role of emerging technologies – from AI‑assisted governance to transparent ledgers – while staying mindful of ethical and privacy concerns. And we will return repeatedly to the core question that animated the original Federalists: how can we design systems that channel human ambition toward the public good?
The Federalist authors wrote for an audience that could not assume the success of their project. They relied on persuasion, evidence and appeals to common interest. In the same way, this series will not ask readers to accept a utopia. It will present a framework for discussion, acknowledge trade‑offs and invite critique. If we are to step beyond failing institutions and polarised rhetoric, we must first diagnose our world honestly and then imagine better rules. What follows, then, is not a manifesto but an invitation.
[1] [2] [3] [26] Global Risks Report 2025: Conflict, Environment and Disinformation Top Threats > Press releases | World Economic Forum https://www.weforum.org/press/2025/01/global-risks-report-2025-conflict-environment-and-disinformation-top-threats/
[4] UN faces ‘race to bankruptcy’ as Guterres unveils sharply reduced 2026 budget | UN News https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/10/1166128
[5] UN at 80: Funding challenges at the United Nations – House of Commons Library https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10379/
[6] [9] UN experts condemn US aggression against Venezuela | OHCHR https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/01/un-experts-condemn-us-aggression-against-venezuela
[7] [8] [10] World reacts to US strikes on Venezuela | Reuters https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/world-reacts-us-strikes-venezuela-2026-01-03/
[11] Security Council Fails to Adopt Resolution Calling for Permanent Ceasefire in Gaza, Owing to Veto by United States | UN Meetings Coverage and Press Releases https://press.un.org/en/2025/sc16078.doc.htm
[12] 2026-2027 UN Security Council Elections and the Responsibility to Protect – World | ReliefWeb https://reliefweb.int/report/world/2026-2027-un-security-council-elections-and-responsibility-protect
[13] [14] [15] [16] NATO’s “Brain Death” in The Hague https://www.csis.org/analysis/natos-brain-death-hague
[17] NATO’s 5-Percent Defense Spending Pledge Exposes Deep Alliance Fractures: An Analysis https://www.newamerica.org/future-frontlines/blogs/nato-unity-some-assembly-required/
[18] [19] Perceived Political Violence Risks Push Factions Toward Preemptive Retaliation, Researchers Warn https://www.asisonline.org/security-management-magazine/latest-news/today-in-security/2025/september/political-violence-risks/
[20] [21] Is the United States Headed Toward a Civil War? https://www.csis.org/analysis/united-states-headed-toward-civil-war
[22] [23] New protests erupt in Iran as supreme leader signals upcoming crackdown | Iran | The Guardian https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2026/jan/09/iran-supreme-leader-harsher-crackdown-protest-movement-swells
[24] ‘It will take a generation’: Iranians abroad on the protests – and change | Iran | The Guardian https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jan/17/iranians-abroad-protests-change
[25] Is Iran on the brink of change? | Brookings https://www.brookings.edu/articles/is-iran-on-the-brink-of-change/
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